A (very) brief doxographical analysis of constructivism: From pre-socratics to second-order cybernetics by Salas Llanas, Israel
A (Very) Brief Doxographical Analysis  
of Constructivism: from Pre-Socratics 
to Second-Order Cybernetics
Israel Salas Llanas
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain / Osaka University, Japan
 israel.salas@predoc.uam.es
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15366/bp2018.18.003
Bajo Palabra. II Época. Nº18. Pgs: 61-76
 
Brevísimo análisis doxográfico sobre el Constructivismo: 





El constructivismo es una corriente 
filosófica con una fuerte presencia en la 
epistemología contemporánea. Esta es-
cuela de pensamiento suscribe la tesis de 
que el conocimiento se construye activa-
mente por el sujeto cognoscente y res-
ponde a una forma de situarse frente a la 
experiencia, siendo esta la última realidad 
efectivamente accesible. Este trabajo traza 
una breve curva interdisciplinar que com-
prende algunas de las más importantes 
posturas filosóficas que contribuyeron a 
la consolidación de esta escuela de pensa-
miento durante más de veinticinco siglos.
Palabras clave: constructivismo, ciber-
nética, epistemología, historia de la filoso-
fía, percepción, realidad.
Abstract
Constructivism is a philosophi-
cal current that manifests itself great-
ly within the realm of contemporary 
epistemology. Its bases come from the 
idea that knowledge is not only active-
ly constructed by the observer but also 
provides a lens through which reality 
can be interpreted as a result of expe-
riences. This paper traces a brief inter-
disciplinary curve that outlines some 
of the most important philosophical 
approaches that contributed to the con-
solidation of this school of thought for 
more than twenty-five centuries. 
Keywords: Constructivism, Cybernetics, 
Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Per-
ception, Reality.
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Hilary Putnam was not entirely right when he argued that “it is impossible to find a philosopher before Kant and after pre-Socratics who was not a metaphysical realist, at least about what he took to be basic or unreducible 
assertions 1”. In other words, a philosopher who does not tie the idea of reality to 
the notion of objective validity. This paper belies such assertion and draws a brief 
historical review of some authors whose contributions gradually consolidated a new 
epistemological approach to the study of reality.
Constructivism in the Classical period
The first theoretical settlements of this philosophical trend were born in the 
pre-Socratic era, by the hand of philosophers such as Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Xeno-
phanes, Democritus, or Protagoras. All of them may be considered as precursors of 
Constructivism. Notwithstanding, much before the birth of the Old Stoa, the Vedas, 
the four oldest sacred texts of Indian literature, already reflected these philosophical 
principles asserting that reality is Maya, a Sanskrit word whose meaning is “delu-
sion” or “illusion”, which refers to a limitation of universal consciousness that flows 
through our senses and constrains us to perceive multiplicity over unity.
In the Classical Greece, Xenophanes, concerned about the influence that cer-
tain beliefs might have in the Greek society, asserted: “The Ethiopians represent 
their gods black, and flat nosed; the Thracians theirs swarthy and blue eyed, and 
they assimilate the minds of their gods to their own 2”. With this ironic critique 
to the anthropomorphism, Xenophanes suggested that perceptions are closely in-
fluenced by religious beliefs, thus every man or race will depict their gods with 
their own particular features and attributes. This thought spread afterwards to the 
Sophists, such as Gorgias, who claimed that knowledge is something that occurs 
within the observer, limiting it to be an individual phenomenon. In this sense, 
all knowledge would be reduced to individual experience and built through the 
senses and the contents of memory. And Protagoras, with his aphorism Ánthrōpos 
1  Glasersfeld, E. von, “Introduction to Radical Constructivism”, The Invented Reality, New York, Norton Press, 
1984, p. 18.
2  Ensor, G., A Review of Miracles, Prophecies, & Mysteries of the Old and New Testaments and of the Morality and 
Consolation of the Christian Religion, London, John Brooks, 1835, p. 85.
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metron 3, held that reality is only what is manifested in the consciousness of the 
observer. As a result, the knowledge that an individual possesses of the world is 
because of it has been acquired according to his own experience. Protagoras’ rela-
tivism denied that perception was a reliable image of reality. The act of perception 
varies from subject to subject according to different situations, denying all possi-
bility of true knowledge. In this way, the value of plurality, the abstention of all 
judgment, and every attempt to unify the thought entail the consideration of each 
one of the different realities constructed according to the individual perspectives 
of each subject. Reality is presented differently according to the experience, so that 
any attempt to impose a supposed universality to the world is considered as an act 
of domination. 
In the Hellenistic age, Pyrrho of Elis revisited some pre-Socratics postulates and 
aver that perception reveals what appears, but it does not offer a direct testimony 
of what really is. The Pyrrhonian legacy was preserved for several centuries, until 
Sextus Empiricus revived some Pyrrhonian tenets in Outlines: “The apple seems 
smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. But it is not evident whether it really has these 
and only these qualities; or whether, having only one quality, it appears differently 
depending on the different constitutions of the sense organs, or again whether it 
has more qualities than are apparent but some of them do not affect us 4”. Thus, 
“we shall not be able to say how any external object or state of affairs is in its nature, 
but only how it appears in relations to a given way of life or law or custom, and so 
forth 5”.
Constructivism in Renaissance 
The arrival of Renaissance brought with it a series of scientific, philosophical 
and theological ideas that marked a turning point in constructivist philosophy. 
René Descartes, considered the epigone par excellence of scientific revolution of his 
time and the father of rationalism, retrieved some constructivist approaches from 
the pre-Socratic philosophers, such as perception becomes the sum of the opera-
tions of cognition. In his Second Meditation, Descartes limits the act of perceiving 
to an act of consciousness on the sensation itself: “Yet I certainly seem to see, to 
hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory 
3  In Greek: ἄνθρωπος μέτρον (“Man [is] the measure [of all things]”). Motto of Protagoras as quoted in Plato’s 
Theaetetus 152a.
4  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 18-19.
5  Ibid., p. 29.
— 65
perception’ is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply 
thinking 6”. 
Nevertheless, Cartesian ideas had already been formulated before by other 
contemporary philosophers, such as Francisco Sánchez, “the Skeptic”. Sánchez’s 
philosophy introduced a phenomenology of probability, according to it our 
knowledge is merely probable and only of appearances. Even prior to the de-
velopment of Sánchez and Cartesian tenets, the English medieval philosopher 
William of Ockham, a representative of nominalism and one of the precursors 
of empiricism, introduced in his philosophy an epistemological nominalism that 
questioned the certainty of our knowledge about the physical world. Anticipating 
Descartes, Ockham suggests that if the observer can possess an intuition without 
the existence of an entity that causes such intuition, then he cannot be sure of 
reality he senses or perceives, so all science of nature turns into problematic. These 
Ockhamist ideas are also present in the Cartesian hypothesis of the “malicious 
demon”: “I will suppose therefore that not God […], but rather some malicious 
demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order 
to deceive me 7”. This malicious demon hypothesis suggests that our recognition 
of something as true is a consequence of our nature, so if we could change our 
nature our perception of reality would also change. 
Half century later, one of the most important constructivist innovators of that 
time was Giambattista Vico. With his principle Verum esse ipsum factum (“The true 
itself is made”), Vico opposed to Cartesian rationalism insofar as he regards crea-
tivity as a properly human faculty, so the only knowable truth lies in the results of 
the creative exercise of human action. In De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia, Vico 
asserts: 
“For if the senses are [active] faculties, we make the color of thigs by seeing, 
flavor by tasting, sound by hearing, and heat and cold by touching. […] In keeping 
with these examples, true intellect is a faculty by which we make something true 
when we understand it. […] It follows from these arguments that, just as man by 
activating his mind brings the modes and images of things into being and generates 
human truth 8.”
This quotation summarizes Vico’s philosophy about cognitive process, empha-
sizing that we cannot apprehend the world without a perception. The observer is 
a cognizer, the cornerstone of the act of knowing, and it is in human mind where 
the principles and the causes are located. A few years later, in Principi di Scienza 
6  Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 19.
7  Ibid., 15.
8  Vico, G., On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 93-94.
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Nuova, Vico defined science as a source of knowledge that aspires to universal 
and eternal principles. However, for Vico knowledge does not correspond to the 
immutable realm of truth, but it is the effort to make things correspond each 
other in beautiful proportions. That is why he draws a distinction between what 
he considers coscienza (consciousness), the study of particular facts, and scienza 
(science), the study of truth, that is, universal and eternal principles applicable 
anytime and anywhere.
Vico’s contributions to Constructivism entailed a rupture with traditional epis-
temology that since Plato attempted to apprehend how the world is essentially. In 
contrast, Vico’s ideas suggested that we can only know what is somehow constructed 
by us through our experience, so nothing we construct claims for a real truth in 
terms of an ontological reality. 
Constructivism in the Enlightenment Period: The Empirical Legacy
From the mid-seventeenth century, among the empiricists, John Locke suggest-
ed that experience is the only thing to be considered when addressing knowledge. 
Locke’s concept of tabula rasa asserted that all our knowledge has been actively con-
structed through the sensory perception of the world and experience, but it also 
requires the help of reason. As Descartes, Locke accepts the thesis that secondary 
qualities of physical entities (v.gr.: color, taste, texture, etc.) are not present in nature, 
but they are attributions created in the mind of the observer. However, Locke adds 
that these secondary qualities are the result of the interaction between human mind 
and the physical entities:
“Qualities thus considered in bodies, are, first, such as are utterly inseparable 
from the body, in what state so ever it be; such as, in all alterations and changes it 
suffers […] These I call original or primary qualities of body, which, I think, we 
may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or 
rest, and number. […] Secondly, such qualities, which, in truth, are nothing in the 
objects themselves, but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary 
qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible ports, as 
colors, sounds, tastes, …, these I call secondary qualities 9.”
Thus, our knowledge of the external world is mediated by our knowledge of 
these secondary attributions which must have a certain degree of resemblance with 
the physical entities.
9  Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London, T. Tegg and Son, 1836, pp. 171-172.
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Nevertheless, Locke’s ideas fail to solve some problems of Cartesian dualism. The 
attributions by means of which we apprehend the outside reality do not guarantee a 
reliable knowledge of this ‘supposed’ external world, because this is hidden behind 
the veil of such attributions. For Locke, these attributions impose the limit to our 
understanding of reality. The cognizer has access to the represented images created 
through sensorial contact with these entities, but not with the entities themselves. 
Locke expresses it in An Examination of P. Malebranche’s, of posthumous publica-
tion: “Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and 
motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these pro-
duce ideas in our minds I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible. 
This I can resolve only into good pleasure of God, whose ways are past finding 
out 10”. Locke’s philosophical postulates settled the foundations for a constructivist 
tradition with an empiricist origin that would reach its peak with many contribu-
tions in the eighteenth century.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the arrival of Enlightenment, 
the Irish philosopher and Anglican bishop George Berkeley recognized himself as 
an important precursor of this constructivist epistemology. With his aphorism Esse 
est percipi (“To be is to be perceived”), Berkeley developed a stream of thought 
based on a subjective idealism, later called immaterialism, which assumed that the 
world is not transcendent, it exists only through the act of perception. In this doc-
trine, Berkeley denied the existence of material corpuscles and suggested that the 
physical world is the result of the ideas that God transforms manifestly sensitive 
for our perception 11. This opinion was also shared by the French philosopher and 
theologian Nicolas Malebranche, who quotes in De la recherche de la verité: “When 
we perceive something sensible, two things are found in our perception: sensation 
and pure idea. The sensation is a modification of our soul, and it is God who causes 
it in us 12”.
Unlike Locke, Berkeley does not accept the idea of a sensible entity is anything 
more than we can perceive sensorially; however, he accepts the Lockean argument 
about the secondary qualities of entities allow us to apprehend the primary ones. 
Berkeley agrees in this point with Locke, as well as the ideas proposed by Male-
branche, who suggests in Conversations chrétiennes: “Color, pain and all other senti-
ments are only sensitive perceptions, result of intelligible ideas 13”.
10  Locke, J., The Works of John Locke: Volume 9, London, Harvard College Library, 1812, pp. 217.
11  This idea had already been asserted centuries ago by theologians, such as St. Dionysius the Areopagite’s who 
held that only God has the power to convert the intelligible into sensible for our understanding.
12  Malebranche, N., The Search after Truth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 234.
13  Malebranche, N., Conversations chrétiennes: Méditations sur l’humilité, Paris, Vrin, 2010, p. 153.
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Within the constructivist position of his philosophy, Berkeley also assents the 
proposals of Locke and Descartes about the impossibility of knowing the material 
entities that cause the perceptions, since the only access we have to obtain knowledge 
of an entity is the perception that this entity projects in us. On the contrary, Berke-
ley assumes that when one refers to an entity of natural world, one actually refers to 
the one’s perception of such entity, and it is language that makes possible to extend 
particular observations to the general domain, not the abstraction. Unlike Locke, 
Berkeley’s position assumes that knowledge of the empirical world is obtained only 
through sensible perception, without the aid of reason. Consequently, the aim of 
science must be to eliminate all intellect from human perceptions, since the physical 
world is the set of perceptions that God creates in us, so God resides in every single 
of our perceptions and in the coherent order of all ideas.
Another coetaneous and leading empiricist of Constructivism was the phi-
losopher David Hume whose philosophy was strongly influenced by the empiricist 
ideas of Locke and Berkeley, asserting that all knowledge derives from sensible ex-
perience which is the only reliable source of knowledge. So, in An Enquiry, Hume 
quotes: “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any 
time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said no 
to exist 14”.
Constructivism in the Enlightenment Period: The Kantian Revolution
Although the empirical legacy spanned until the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, it was not until the arrival of Immanuel Kant that Constructivism recognizes 
itself as a genuine epistemology. The innovation of constructivist thought arose 
from Kant’s assertion that the judgments which emanate from experience (a poste-
riori) are deprived of universality, and only those aprioristic forms (a priori) acquire 
universal validity, through which we can perceive all the diversity of phenomena. In 
this way, reality is understood as the collective conception of all entities emanating 
from experience.
According to Kant these a priori forms of perceptions must be innate (v.gr.: 
space, time and causality) and necessary to structure and organize the knowledge 
generated by experience, so these a priori forms describe the framework within 
which the cognizer operates. These aprioristic forms also act as filters of perception 
14  Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Understanding, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888, p. 252.
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and prevent us from having direct access to the study of natural entities. In addi-
tion, they function as internal representations, e.g., models of reality that allow us 
to construct not only the surrounding world, but also our behavior and the way of 
intervening within it. In Kant’s words: 
“Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of 
which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the sec-
ond the faculty for recognizing an object by means of these representations (spon-
taneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter 
it is thought in relation to that representation 15.”
Therefore, all the entities that shape our experience are necessarily determined 
by our way of structuring space, time and causality. However, if we consider these 
forms as innate ways of experiencing the world (a priori) they would become part 
of the sphere of the phenomena and not of the reality itself. Thus, recapturing 
Sextus Empiricus’ example of the apple, the properties of the apple are not only 
questioned, but now also the condition of the apple itself as an independent entity 
separated from the rest of the world. 
This approach presents a problem. If our senses cannot provide us with a com-
plete certainty of an objective structure of reality, how would be possible to con-
figure a structure in our experiential scheme when this structure is not provided by 
reality? Kantian thesis depicts an epistemological trouble because of it is not able to 
explain the origin of these representations. In addition, his notion of a priori refers 
at the end to a revised Platonic version of the ideas as categories. 
However, Vico had already paved the path for solving this problem some years 
earlier: “The true is precisely what is made 16”. In other words, the world we expe-
rience is so because we have constructed it. Unlike Kant, for whom such construc-
tion is determined by unalterable a priori forms of thought, Vico argues that the 
way in which we construct our world of experience is determined by our history, 
that is, what is built previously limits what can be built now. So all construction 
carried out by the cognizer is, in sum, the result of all previous construction, so 
every act of construction is causally determined. Vico’s ideas assume a mechanist 
view of the world introducing the notion of causality. Every act of construction is 
the result of an antecedent, of constructing a reality according to a mode of active 
operation of the cognizer at a given moment.
Another important contribution of Kant to Constructivism was the role of con-
sciousness in the act of perceiving, considering that reality cannot be perceived in 
15  Kant, I., Critique of Pure reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1888, p. 193.
16  Vico, G., On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, op. cit., p. 46.
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its natural form, since an act of perceiving is performed the cognizer orders the 
sensory data in a theoretical or mental frame: 
“It may look, to be sure, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from 
its concept in itself (it is certainly independent of experience); for in fact we can 
give it an object entirely a priori, i.e., construct it. But since this is only the form of 
an object, it would still always remain only a product of the imagination, the pos-
sibility of whose object would still remain doubtful, as requiring something more, 
namely that such a figure be thought solely under those conditions on which all 
objects of experience rest 17.”
Kant’s ideas entailed a new Copernican revolution to the hitherto passivity of 
the observer. The observer is considered happened to be considered as an active 
entity and the act of knowing modifies the perceived reality. For Kant, we can only 
know what our mind constructs, which is at the same time a necessary condition of 
knowledge, but we cannot know the external reality, that is, the world independent 
of the observer.
Constructivism in the Twentieth Century: 
The Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the study of the brain became fun-
damental because of its role in the cognitive process which articulates the way 
knowledge is configured. New researches in the study of cognitive processes fo-
cused special attention to the neurophysiological bases of living organism that in-
tervene in the processes of interpretation and representation of knowledge. Thus, 
Constructivism became part of the cybernetic paradigm of perception, that is, the 
construction of invariants that function as schemas and that allow, at the same 
time, to order the whole flow of experience. This new approach to the study of rea-
soning involved a paradigm shift, focusing special attention on those adaptive pat-
terns of living organisms with the environment and binding the mental functions 
of these organisms to the same process. The adoption of this evolutionary approach 
in the study of knowledge acquisition was called Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge, 
and was originally developed by ethologists, biologists that study animal behavior 
in their natural habitat. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the German biologist Jakob J. von 
Uexküll, considered as the father of ethology, carried out important researches into 
17  Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 324.
— 71
what he called Umwelt, or “surrounding world”. Uexküll hypothesized that each 
living organism possesses a set of genetic predispositions that allow it to perceive a 
series of stimuli coming from the environment, thus causing a number of efferent 
responses according to its structure and evolutionary morphology. The organism 
does not interact with the outside world itself, but with a series of affine signs that 
are related to it and that lead it to perform specific actions. Uexküll called this 
Funktionkreis, or “functional circle”, a concept which Uexküll illustrates by the 
example of the tick: 
“Now let us place the tick into the functional cycle as subject and the mammal as 
its object. It is seen that three functional cycles take place […] The mammal’s skin 
glands comprise the feature carriers of the first cycle, since the stimulus of the bu-
tyric acid sets off certain perception signs in the [tick’s] perception organ, and these 
signs are transposed outward as olfactory features. The processes in the perception 
organ bring about corresponding impulses by induction in the [tick`s] effect organ 
which then bring about the releasing of the legs and falling. The falling tick imparts 
to the mammal’s hairs, on which it lands, the effect mark ‘collision’, which then 
activates a tactile feature which, in its turn, extinguishes the olfactory feature ‘bu-
tyric acid’. The new feature activates the tick’s running about, until this feature is 
in turn extinguished at the first bare path of the skin by the feature ‘warmth’, and 
the drilling can begin 18.” 
Uexküll uses the tick as an example to argue that there is not the same reality 
perceived equally by all different types of organisms. In the case of the tick, its 
perceived reality is constrained by the number of perceived stimuli, which are, at 
the same time, Merkmalträger, that is, bearers of meaning. These stimuli are access 
vectors to an external reality and represent the only relationship that binds the tick 
to the outside world, out of which nothing exists. The reality presented to other liv-
ing organisms will differ from the tick’s reality depending on the number of access 
vectors they have, which will be determined by the set of genetic predispositions 
as the result of evolutionary patterns that have preceded the organism itself. In 
accordance with Uexküll, what we refer to the external world is nothing more than 
the result of the interaction of our own genetic predispositions with those signs 
or signals that allow us to intervene with our environment. Each organism has its 
owns, and thus a different spectrum of perception and meaning. 
Uexküll’s thesis constituted a paradigm shift in the study of subjectivity, denying 
the legitimacy of a world or reality outside of subjective experiences. At the same 
18  Uexküll, J. von, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010, p. 50.
72 —
time, this functional circle conditions the organism to perceive its environment 
through its receptor organs, which function as translators of meaning. Thus, the 
functional circle of each organism constitutes its own world, cohabiting with the 
rest of organisms in isolation within its own reality, whose totality is constructed 
within the limits of its functional circle. Everything that coexists in the sphere of 
a surrounding world is transformed and modified until it becomes the bearer of 
useable meaning or, in the opposite case, it is totally abandoned.
After Uexküll’s contributions, Konrad Lorenz was the first to postulate the exist-
ence of a cognitive subconscious through which learning becomes possible. Lorenz 
called this sunbsconscious a “ratiomorphic system”, a term borrowed from Egon 
Brunswik 19, which was described as a set of innate knowledge that allows us to 
acquire new ones from the surrounding environment. This ratiomorphic system 
does not operate on logical or rational criteria, since it is a subconscious process, 
but nevertheless it carries out a large number of cognitive functions that condition 
our perception of the world. 
Lorenz retrieves Kantian postulates by assuming that a kind of knowledge prior 
to experience is necessary in living organisms that makes possible the adaptation 
of necessary laws to ensure their survival. Kant’s a priori judgements, as Lorenz 
maintains, are a posteriori from the evolutionary point of view, that is, empirical 
products of the mechanism of knowledge acquisition, mechanisms of survival that 
have been introduced in reason by the evolution of this ratiomorphic apparatus. As 
Lorenz quotes: “One must realize that this conception of the a priori as an organ 
means the destruction of the concept: something that has evolved in evolutionary 
adaptation to the laws of the natural external world has evolved a posteriori in a cer-
tain sense, even if in a way entirely different from that of abstraction or deduction 
from previous experience 20”.
The Constructivism in the Twentieth Century:  
The Impact of Second-Order Cybernetics
Among all the disciplines that contributed to the consolidation of Construc-
tivism as a genuine epistemology, Cybernetics deserves special attention due to the 
introduction of new models of analysis that configured the new paradigm of the 
scientific revolution in the twentieth century. Heinz von Foerster, a central figure 
19  Brunswick, W., “Ratiomorphic models of perception and thinking”, Acta Psychologica: 11, 1955, pp. 108-109.
20  Lorenz, K., “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology”, Philosophy after Darwin: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 231-232.
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in the development of the theory of Radical Constructivism and Second-order 
Cybernetics, developed a new theory of knowledge where not only the system is 
studied but also the observer as part of the own system: “A brain is required to write 
a theory of a brain. From this follows that a theory of the brain 21”. Foerster’s con-
tributions derived in the configuration of a Second-order reality, an inner reality 
in which there are not exist the entities, but also the attributions as to the meaning 
and value of these ones. Seen in this way, we live in a constructed reality that sur-
prisingly enables us to carry out specific decisions and actions.
Another of the most relevant representatives whose contributions went a step 
further in the development of Radical Constructivism was the German philosopher 
and theoretician Ernst von Glasersfeld. To the definition provided by Foerster, Gla-
sersfeld adds: “Knowledge can now be seen as something which the organism builds 
up in the attempt to order the as such amorphous flow of experience by establishing 
repeatable experiences and relatively reliable relations between them. The possibil-
ities of constructing such an order are determined and perpetually constrained by 
the preceding steps in the construction 22”. For Glasersfeld, the world we experi-
ence is automatically constructed by ourselves because we do not notice how we 
perform that act of construction. Glasersfeld argues that the relationship between 
knowledge and reality is held to an adaptation or adjustment in a functional sense: 
“The concepts of variation and (natural) selection, taken from Darwin’s theory 
of evolution, opened the possibility of substituting the notion of adaptedness for 
the philosophers’ traditional notion of truth as a correct, or at least approximately 
correct, representation of objective reality 23”. Then, “just the environment places 
constraints on the living organism (biological structure) and eliminates all variants 
that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or ‘viable’, so 
the experiential world […] constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive 
structures) 24”. For Glasersfeld, the theory of evolution provides an adequate analo-
gy for the relationship between cognitive structures with the world of the subject’s 
experience 25. 
In relation to the notion of biological adaptation, Glasersfeld also adopts some 
proposals embedded in the genetic epistemology developed by Jean Piaget, for 
21  Foerster, H. von, Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition, New York, Springer-Ver-
lag, 2003, p. 289.
22  Glasersfeld, E. von, Introduction to Radical Constructivism, op. cit., p. 36.
23  Glasersfeld, E. von, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning, London, Routledge Falmer, 
1995, p. 50.
24  Glasersfeld, E. von, Introduction to Radical Constructivism, op. cit., p. 23.
25  It should be mentioned that the epistemological content of the analogy proposed by Glasersfeld refers to Uex-
küll’s biological ideas, for whom every organism determines its environment by virtue of its genetic predispo-
sitions.
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whom the main function of human cognition is not to depict a reliable representa-
tion of an ontological reality, but it serve as an adaptive instrument in the world of 
experience. Thus, the biological adaptation does not consist of preserve a reliable 
image of reality, but safeguarding a plausible image of the world that allows the 
organism to adapt successfully.
Glasersfeld’s proposal supposed a rupture with the traditional view with the 
traditional theory of knowledge and turned epistemology into an examination of 
how intelligence operates to configure a relatively stable image of the world from 
experience. At this point, Glasersfeld goes a step further than Vico, for whom this 
explanation becomes superfluous, since if the reality experienced is constructed 
by ourselves it is logical to suppose that it maintains some stability. In Glasersfeld 
words: “The human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture 
of the world but only to conjectural interpretation 26”. For Glasersfeld, all cogni-
tive activity implies a teleological character, that is, a purpose that contributes to 
configure a regularity in the experiential world. The cognizer puts into relation a 
new experience with one previously experienced to determine its conceptual char-
acter. The similarity or difference between these two experiences is a result from 
the operations carried out by the cognizer, so it can never be explained as a con-
dition of an objective reality. In other words, the criteria used by the cognizer to 
establish similarity or difference are constructed within his field of perception and, 
under no circumstances, can be attributed to a world independent of the observer.
Conclusion
The historical curve drawn by the interdisciplinary convergence of this current 
of thought consolidated Constructivism as an emerging paradigm in the field of sci-
ence and philosophy. The cognizer’s knowledge is generated through the active and 
subjective construction of ideas and concepts in a continuous interaction between 
the observer and the observed, so reality is not something that can be perceived 
objectively, but it is constructed subjectively. The act of perception does not give us 
a mirror image of what is outside, just a configuration of a mental world delimited 
by our cognitive reach. 
However, Constructivism introduces some epistemological problem. If reality is 
the result of the cognitive construction, should not there be as many realities as in-
dividuals? And, how can it explain the constitution of common realities that delimit 
26  Glasersfeld, E. von, Introduction to Radical Constructivism, op. cit., p. 31.
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the acceptable boundaries of coexistence in society? On the other hand, if reality 
varies from individual to individual, the language that each one uses to describe that 
reality should also change, would not this be an impediment to communication? 
It is also important to mention the role of scientific method in this new paradigm. 
If scientific assertions acquire a supracultural status, is scientific method a way to 
unify realities?
The future of this multidisciplinary research may provide some clarity to the 
aforementioned questions. However, the fact that the human brain plays a leading 
role in configuring how we perceive reality should make us particularly skeptical of 
what we believe, especially given that skepticism is the cornerstone of philosophical 
and scientific progress. To call into question our beliefs and what we perceive as 
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